

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN  
NORTHERN DIVISION

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JERAL PEOPLES,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:05-cv-286

v.

Honorable Gordon J. Quist

UNKNOWN CHOPPLER, et al.,

Defendants.

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**REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION**

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On February 8, 2006, this Court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiff filed an appeal and on January 18, 2008, the Sixth Circuit granted Plaintiff's appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings. On September 12, 2008, the court dismissed Defendants MDOC and Smith, and ordered service on Defendants Choppler and Sweeney. On January 13, 2009, Defendants Choppler and Sweeney filed a motion for summary judgment (docket #78) on the ground that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies. Plaintiff filed responses to this motion (docket #84, #85 and #89). Upon review, I recommend that Defendants' motion for summary judgment based on Plaintiff's failure to exhaust his available administrative remedies be granted.

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); *Kocak v. Comty. Health Partners of Ohio, Inc.*, 400 F.3d 466, 468 (6th

Cir. 2005); *Thomas v. City of Chattanooga*, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005). The standard for determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” *State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. McGowan*, 421 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)); see also *Tucker v. Union of Needletrades Indus. & Textile Employees*, 407 F.3d 784, 787 (6th Cir. 2005). The court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. See *Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); *Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Adkins*, 400 F.3d 293, 296 (6th Cir. 2005).

A prisoner’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, which Defendants have the burden to plead and prove. *Jones v. Bock*, 127 S. Ct. 910, 919-21 (2007). A moving party without the burden of proof need show only that the opponent cannot sustain his burden at trial. See *Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court*, 201 F.3d 784, 787 (6th Cir. 2000); see also *Minadeo v. ICI Paints*, 398 F.3d 751, 761 (6th Cir. 2005). A moving party with the burden of proof faces a “substantially higher hurdle.” *Arnett v. Myers*, 281 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2002); *Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist.*, 270 F.3d 1036, 1056 (6th Cir. 2001). “Where the moving party has the burden -- the plaintiff on a claim for relief or the defendant on an affirmative defense -- his showing must be sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party.” *Calderone v. United States*, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting W. SCHWARZER, *Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact*, 99 F.R.D. 465, 487-88 (1984)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit repeatedly has emphasized that the party with the burden of proof “must show the record contains

evidence satisfying the burden of persuasion and that the evidence is so powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it.” *Arnett*, 281 F.3d at 561 (quoting 11 JAMES WILLIAM MOORE, ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.13[1], at 56-138 (3d ed. 2000); *Cockrel*, 270 F.2d at 1056 (same). Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the party with the burden of persuasion “is inappropriate when the evidence is susceptible of different interpretations or inferences by the trier of fact.” *Hunt v. Cromartie*, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999).

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at the Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility (AMF). In his *pro se* complaint, he sues Defendants Resident Unit Officer Choppler, Case Manager Sweeney, Resident Unit Manager Smith, and the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC).<sup>1</sup> Plaintiff claims that Defendants destroyed his legal materials, which showed that he was innocent of any violence. Plaintiff claims that this conduct violated his right of access to the courts because it prevented him from filing a petition for judicial review challenging a major misconduct conviction. For relief, Plaintiff requests equitable relief.

Defendants claim that they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies. Pursuant to the applicable portion of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), a prisoner bringing an action with respect to prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must exhaust his available administrative remedies. *See Porter v. Nussle*, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002); *Booth v. Churner*, 532 U.S. 731, 733 (2001). A prisoner must first exhaust available administrative remedies, even if the prisoner may not be able to obtain the specific type of relief he seeks in the state administrative process. *See Porter*, 534 U.S. at 520; *Booth*, 532 U.S. at 741; *Knuckles El v. Toombs*, 215 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir. 2000); *Freeman v.*

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<sup>1</sup>As noted above, Defendants Smith and MDOC were dismissed by the court on September 12, 2008.

*Francis*, 196 F.3d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 1999). In order to properly exhaust administrative remedies, prisoners must complete the administrative review process in accordance with the deadlines and other applicable procedural rules. *Jones v. Bock*, 127 S. Ct. 910, 922-23 (2007); *Woodford v. Ngo*, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2386 (2006). “Compliance with prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all that is required by the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust.’” *Jones*, 127 S. Ct. at 922-23.

MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 (effective Dec. 19, 2003)<sup>2</sup>, sets forth the applicable grievance procedures for prisoners in MDOC custody at the time relevant to this complaint. Inmates must first attempt to resolve a problem orally within two business days of becoming aware of the grievable issue, unless prevented by circumstances beyond his or her control *Id.* at ¶ R. If oral resolution is unsuccessful, the inmate may proceed to Step I of the grievance process and submit a completed grievance form within five business days of the attempted oral resolution. *Id.* at ¶¶ R, X. The Policy Directive also provides the following directions for completing grievance forms: “The issues shall be stated briefly. Information provided shall be limited to the facts involving the issue being grieved (i.e., who, what, when, where, why, how). Dates, times, places and names of all those involved in the issue being grieved are to be included.” *Id.* at ¶ T (emphasis in original). The inmate submits the grievance to a designated grievance coordinator, who assigns it to a respondent. *Id.* at ¶ Y.

If the inmate is dissatisfied with the Step I response, or does not receive a timely response, he may appeal to Step II by obtaining an appeal form within five business days of the response, or if no response was received, within five days after the response was due. *Id.* at ¶¶ R, DD. The respondent at Step II is designated by the policy, *e.g.*, the regional health administrator for

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<sup>2</sup>The MDOC amended Policy Directive 03.02.130 on July 9, 2007. However, the 2003 version of the policy directive was in effect at all times applicable to this lawsuit.

a medical care grievances. *Id.* at ¶ FF. If the inmate is still dissatisfied with the Step II response, or does not receive a timely Step II response, he may appeal to Step III using the same appeal form. *Id.* at ¶¶ R, HH. The Step III form shall be sent within ten business days after receiving the Step II response, or if no Step II response was received, within ten business days after the date the Step II response was due. *Id.* at ¶ HH. The Prisoner Affairs Section is the respondent for Step III grievances on behalf of the MDOC director. *Id.* at ¶ II. Time limitations shall be adhered to by the inmate and staff at all steps of the grievance process. *Id.* at ¶ U. “The total grievance process from the point of filing a Step I grievance to providing a Step III response shall be completed within 90 calendar days unless an extension has been approved . . . .” *Id.*

In addition, the grievance policy provides that, where the grievance alleges staff brutality or corruption, the grievance may be submitted directly to Step III. *Id.* at ¶S. In such instances, the grievance must be filed within the time limits prescribed for filing grievances at Step I. *Id.*

Defendants assert that although Plaintiff filed a step I grievance, AMF 05-09-02430-07f, on September 14, 2005, he did not appeal the denial of his grievance to either step II or step III. In support of this assertion, Defendants offer the affidavit of James Armstrong, who is employed as the Manager of the Prisoner Grievance and Appeals Section of the MDOC. Armstrong attests that a query of the Grievance Tracking Database, as well as a review of the hard copies of their records, was completed on Plaintiff and there is no indication that they ever received a step III grievance on AMF 2005-09-2430-07f from Plaintiff. Armstrong further attests that the only step III grievances on record that were filed by Plaintiff around the same date are: AMF 2005-09-2500-20e, filed on September 22, 2005, regarding a Kosher diet request, AMF 2005-11-2965-14f, filed on November 8,

2005, regarding the denial of copies, and AMF 2005-12-3222-07z, filed on December 5, 2005, regarding ineffectiveness of Plaintiff's attorney. (Defendants' Exhibit 2.)

In response to this motion, Plaintiff asserts that he filed step II and step III appeals, and attaches copies of the claimed appeals to his brief in support of his response to the motion (docket #85). There appears to be an issue of fact regarding whether Plaintiff did submit the required appeals. However, a review of the step I grievance in this case reveals that the only place where the names Coppler<sup>3</sup> and Sweeney appear is in the step I response. Plaintiff never names these Defendants in his grievance. Nor does it appear that Plaintiff ever filed a separate grievance regarding the complained of conduct by Defendants Choppler and Sweeney. In order to properly exhaust Michigan Department of Corrections grievance procedures, a prisoner must raise each of his claims for the first time at Step I. *Burton v. Jones*, 321 F.3d 569, 574 (6th Cir. 2003). Raising allegations against a particular defendant for the first time at Step II or III is insufficient to demonstrate exhaustion. *Id.* at 576 n.4. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that Defendants Choppler and Sweeney be granted summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that Defendants' motion for summary judgment (docket #78) be granted. In addition, should the court adopt the report and recommendation in this case, Plaintiff's pending motions for orders (docket #100 and #109), for discovery (docket #115), and for sanctions (docket #116) are properly denied as moot. Finally, Plaintiff's motion to amend (docket #106) is properly denied because he fails to attach his proposed amended complaint to his motion. The court must have knowledge of the substance of the proposed amendment to determine whether "justice so requires" an amendment. *Roskam Baking Co v.*

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<sup>3</sup>Coppler was improperly named by Plaintiff as Choppler in his complaint. Therefore, the court will continue to refer to him as Choppler.

*Lanham Machinery*, 288 F.3d 895, 906 (6th Cir. 2002). The court does not abuse its discretion by denying an amendment where the plaintiff has failed to submit a proposed amended complaint. *Id.*

Should the court adopt the report and recommendation in this case, the court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). *See McGore v. Wrigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the undersigned recommends granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the undersigned discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal. Should the court adopt the report and recommendation and should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the court will assess the \$455 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), *see McGore*, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding *in forma pauperis*, e.g., by the "three-strikes" rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the \$455 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.

/s/ Timothy P. Greeley  
TIMOTHY P. GREELEY  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Dated: August 3, 2009

#### **NOTICE TO PARTIES**

Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed and served within ten days of service of this notice on you. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). All objections and responses to objections are governed by W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of any further right of appeal. *United States v. Walters*, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981); *see Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).